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This paper employs a cost function analysis method to investigate the existence of moral 
hazard in cotton buy-up insurance. The trans-log cost function estimates of the own-price 
elasticity of fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide is -0.222, -0.143, and -0.121, respectively for 
Mississippi cotton production. Our results found statistically significant relationship between 
per acre direct cost and cotton buy-up insurance for year 2001 and 2005 in Mississippi. Our 
results also indicate that moral hazard can either decrease or increase agricultural input usage 
depending specific production condition in an individual year.  But in general the results 
support effects smaller than anecdotal evidence would suggest. 
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  2Introduction 
Each year over 200 million acres are enrolled in the Federal Crop Insurance Program in the 
United States. Major crops are protected by various policy and coverage levels. As in other 
insurance programs, moral hazard has frequently been suggested as an inherient problem.  
Moral hazard is typically defined as the situation where a contractual relationship suffers 
from asymmetric information due to the behavior of one or both contractual parties being able 
to shirk on the contract in a way that alters the expected payout. In the case of crop insurance 
programs, insured agricultural producers would realize they do not bear full consequences of 
their actions when bad outcomes are indemnified. Therefore, they may have a tendency to 
reoptimize input use decisions under the assumption that the insurer will not monitor 
behavior closely enough to catch the producer shirking from the “good farming practices” 
which are defined by RMA as: 
“The production methods utilized to produce the insured crop and allow it to 
make normal progress toward maturity and produce at least the yield used to 
determine the production guarantee or amount of insurance, including any 
adjustments for late planted acreage, which are: (1) for conventional or 
sustainable farming practices, those generally recognized by agricultural 
experts for the area; or (2) for organic farming practices, those generally 
recognized by the organic agricultural industry for the area or contained in 
the organic plan.” (RMA, 2005)  
  3 Anecdotal stories have suggested that moral hazard behaviors exist in producers’ 
agricultural input decisions, in particular, the chemical use of fertilizer, pesticide, and 
herbicides.  For example, the report by Barnett et al. (2002) was commissioned in response to 
a wide-spread perception that insurance induced significant new cotton acreage into 
production and that producers shirked on inputs.  That study found that acreage shifts were 
driven primarily by price expectations and failed to draw conclusions regarding input use due 
to a lack of data.  
Cotton provides a fruitful subject to research moral hazard in crop insurance due to 
the management practices of producing the crop.  Cotton typically requires numerous 
decisions about inputs during the seasons.  For example, professional crop scouting is quite 
common in this crop due to reoptimization of inputs as weather, insect populations and other 
factors are revealed. Figure 1 shows the fertilizer, herbicides and insecticide per acre cost for 
Mississippi cotton producers over the period of 1998-2007. It clearly indicates that 
agricultural chemical inputs vary over times. In addition to factors such as price effects, 
technological innovation, and other factors, moral hazard potentially is one of reasons that 
contribute to the fluctuation in agricultural chemical use. How moral hazard changes 
producers’ behaviors in agricultural input usage without question bears important policy 
implications. 
 Results from previous empirical studies on the effects of crop insurance on chemical 
use, however, are not consistent with each other. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) found that 
crop insurance increased fertilizer and pesticide use in corn production in the Midwest by 
  419% and 21%, respectively. Their conclusions imply that both fertilizer and pesticides may 
be risk-increasing inputs and the implementation of crop insurance subsidies is likely to have 
large adverse environmental impacts as more chemicals are used by farmers due to moral 
hazard behaviors. Other studies (e.g. Smith and Goodwin, 1996, Babcock and Hennessy, 
1996) showed contrary results of modest declines in input use after insurance adoption.  
Different research methods have been used in previous studies. For example, 
Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) employed a Heckman selection model and Smith and 
Goodwin (1996) used instrumental variables (IV) procedure to consider the endogeneity of 
insurance and input use decisions.  Babcock and Hennessy (1996) estimated a stochastic crop 
production function and indirectly derived the link between input use and crop insurance. 
Coble et al. (1997) and Roberts, Key and O’Donoghue (2006) identified the effect of crop 
insurance by examining how yields differ before and after farmers sign up for crop insurance.  
In lights of the mixed conclusion with regard to moral hazard behavior and 
agricultural input use, we propose a cost function analysis to examine the effect of crop 
insurance on agricultural input use. Our study aims to complement previous studies in this 
area in two very specific aspects. First, to our knowledge no study has examined how 
insurance adoption affects total agricultural inputs at farm operator level as well as the share 
of different agricultural inputs. Second, previous studies were conducted for wheat, corn, and 
soybeans in their respective production regions. Despite being one of the major crops for the 
Southeastern region and because of input management intensity likely having moral hazard 
potential, cotton has not been examined. The analysis is made possible by a set of annual 
  5survey data among Mississippi cotton producers. The Mississippi Agricultural and Forestry 
Experiment Station (MAFES) has been conducting cropping practice of major crops on 
annual basis in Mississippi since 1980s. Crop insurance information was added into the 
survey design in 1998. Detailed information on insurance coverage enables us to carry out the 
study. 
Conceptual framework 
Consider a risk-neutral government insurer offering insurance to a market of risk-averse 
individuals.  Assume also that the insurance market is not competitive, in that no private firm 
will enter the market and provide competitively rated insurance products.  The crop 
producer’s crop insurance coverage level is chosen prior to planting as is mandated by RMA 
sign-up deadlines. Then consider a risk-averse farm household whose decision issue is to 
choose a level of input to maximize expected utility of cotton production subject to 
technology constraint. Denote crop yield as Y, output price as ,  y p ( ) n p p p ,..., 1 =  is the input 
price vector and   is a vector of input level, z is the fixed factor. C is the total 
input cost, which is equal to . Denote   as the price guarantee provided by 
insurance coverage level L,   as the premium rate at coverage level L. 
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Y  is the APH yield.  
Since output Y and total cost are conditional on input level, a producer’s optimization 
problem can be expressed as: 
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In the empirical estimation using duality theory we specified and estimated a trans-log 
cost function and a system of share equations of agricultural inputs.
1 The trans-log cost 
function is specified as: 
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Where  denote the N different inputs used in production and N j i ,..., 1 , = ji ij β β = . 
DM_Buyup is the dummy for buy-up coverage insurance.  is the dummies for specific 
production condition. The share equations of fertilizer, pesticide, herbicide, labor and fuel, 
and other inputs cost are:  
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Since the shares of total input cost sums up to one. The estimation of other inputs is 
omitted. We use the GMM procedure to estimate the cost function and share equation system. 
Heteroscedasticity is tested and corrected accordingly. We also impose the following 
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1 We recognize that the trans-log cost function estimated omits the second and higher moments associated with 
risk.  In effect this model is a first-order approximation. 
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Data 
The Mississippi Agricultural and Forestry Experiment Station and the Mississippi 
Agricultural Statistics Service conduct a survey of producers of major field crops in 
Mississippi each year. In this study cotton cropping practice survey data from 1998 to 2007 
are used for the analysis. In Mississippi, produces use a variety of agricultural inputs in cotton 
production. We categorize direct agricultural inputs into five groups, which are fertilizer, 
herbicide, insecticide, labor and fuel, and other inputs. For each category an aggregate 
composite input was computed using Fisher’s ideal price index. In this study all costs are per 
acre direct cost in dollars. The descriptive summary of input costs is listed in table1. Table1 
shows that on average per acre total direct cost is $156 among surveyed producers. Yield 
averages near 753 pounds per acre. Fertilizer, herbicide, insecticide and labor inputs share of 
total cost is 12%, 9%, 6% and 16%, respectively.  
Insurance information is available from 1998. Among the 1254 producers, 704 
producers (approximately 56% of total producers) purchased catastrophic coverage for the 
period of 1998-2007. 448 purchased buy-up insurances which accounts for 36%. Table2 
shows how insurance purchase pattern changed among cotton producers over the past ten 
year period. In the late 1990’s each year over 70% producers purchased catastrophic coverage. 
Starting from 2000, the year the Agricultural Risk Protection Act was passed, the proportion 
of buy-up coverage insurance purchases increased and the percentage of catastrophic 
  8coverage purchases decreased from over 70% to a relatively stable range of 50-60%. In this 
study, we hypothesize that moral hazard is more likely in the case of buy-up insurance, which 
include buy-up crop yield insurance (MPCI or APH) and buy-up revenue insurance (CRC). 
This is because higher coverage inherently implies a smaller deductable. As is well-known in 
insurance literature a deductible serves as an disincentive to moral hazard behavior (Pauly, 
1974). We create an insurance dummy to investigate how purchases of buy-up insurance will 
affect input costs.  The insurance dummy is given a value of 1 when buy-up insurance is 
purchased and 0 when buy-up is not purchased. Our estimated model interacts year specific 
dummy variables with the insurance dummies.  This is done to allow year-specific moral 
hazard behavior.  Coble et al. (1997) found that moral hazard behavior varied by crop year 
and conclude this was due to variation in growing conditions.   
The producers in our data were randomly chosen each year, the data therefore is a 
cross sectional by nature.
2 We created more dummies to account for specific production 
conditions by year, region, irrigation and trend. Year dummy is created for each individual 
year from 1998 to 2006 with year 2007 being the base. Region dummy is given a value of 1 if 
it’s located in upper and lower delta region and a value of 0 otherwise. Irrigation dummy 
denotes if irrigation is used in cotton production.    
Results  
The estimation results of trans-log cost function are listed in table 3 and table 4. In table 3 
coefficient estimates for fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide prices have expected sign and 
                                                 
2 A true panel would be preferred for this analysis.  We did use various dummy variables across time and region 
to attempt to address the lack of a true panel. 
  9are statistically at 1% level. Cross price interactions have expected sign and statistically at 1% 
level.  Using coefficient estimates for price and cross-price effects we derived both Allen 
elasticities of substitution (table 5) and own and cross-price elasticities of input demands for 
fertilizer, herbicide, insecticide and labor fuel cost (table 6).  
  Table 5 lists the Allen Elasticities of substitution. The results show that substitution 
exists between agricultural inputs. Allen elasticity of substitution between fertilizer and labor 
fuel cost is the highest, followed by the substitution between insecticide and labor fuel cost, 
fertilizer and herbicide.  Table 6 lists the own and cross price elasticities of input demands. 
The results show that all the own price elasticities have expected negative sign and are 
inelastic. As agricultural input price increases by 1%, fertilizer, herbicide, insecticide demand 
will decrease by 0.222%, 0.143%, and 0.121%, respectively. Compared with own price 
elasticities the magnitude of cross-price elasticities are small. For example, one percent price 
increase in fertilizer will induce a 0.04% increase in herbicide demand.  
As shown in table 4 our results found in general the impact of buy-up cotton insurance 
on agricultural input cost is not statistically significant for most years that we investigated. 
However, we found year 2001 and year 2005 buy-up insurance has statistically significant 
effects on total per acre cost. In Mississippi there was a huge acreage jump in cotton from 1.3 
million acres in the previous year to 1.6 million acres in 2001 due to product prices changes 
in early 2001. In effect, price signals at the time planting decisions were made suggested 
planting cotton rather than soybeans.  Compared with other years, 2005 experienced relative 
poor cotton production. Our results further indicate that buy-up insurance can have both 
  10positive and negative effects on cost. In 2001 the impact of buy-up insurance was to increase 
the total cost which is consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis under the assumption these 
inputs are risk decreasing. The magnitude of buy-up insurance effect, however, is small. For 
example, by our estimation, as fertilizer, herbicide and insecticide price increase by 1%, the 
total cost will increase by 0.21%, 0.15%, and 0.28%, respectively. In contrast, buy-up 
insurance purchases in 2001 will only increase total cost by 0.02%.  In 2005 the buy-up 
insurance participation was associated with a decrease the input cost, which is counter to our 
expectations, but of a relatively small magnitude of 0.03.   
Discussion 
In this study we adopt a cost function analysis method to investigate the impact of cotton buy-
up insurance purchases on agricultural inputs. The results show that moral hazard exist for 
certain years, but not for all the years from 1998 to 2006. This result appears inconsistent 
with widespread stories of how common and severe moral hazard behaviors are in cotton 
production in the Southeastern region. However, as production condition and the marketing 
environment changes year by year, our results illustrate that moral hazard are likely to be 
conditional on the growing conditions. Due to data limitation, we are not able to relate 
producer characteristics to moral hazard behaviors, which may require further studies in the 
future.  
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Figure1. Fertilizer, herbicide and insecticide per acre cost for Mississippi cotton 
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Table1. Descriptive summary of input cost in Mississippi cotton production from 1998-
2007 
Variable N  Mean 
Std 
Dev Minimum  Maximum
Total per acre direct cost (dollar)  1254 362.29 71.87  185.16  642.27 
Cotton yield (pound)  1254 753.18 240.76  44.00  1700.00 
per acre fertilizer cost (dollar)  1254 45.06  22.39  0.00  144.05 
per acre herbicide cost in dollar  1254 33.52  17.23  0.00  110.96 
per acre insecticide cost in dollars  1254 24.26  22.83  0.00  142.83 
per acre labor and fuel cost in dollars  1254 55.52  14.63  0.00  113.43 
per acre other cost in dollars  1254 203.92 49.66  81.12  410.74 
Share of fertilizer cost over total direct 
cost 
1254 0.12 0.06  0.00  0.34 
Share of herbicide cost over total direct 
cost 
1254 0.09 0.05  0.00  0.33 
Share of insecticide cost over total direct 
cost 
1254 0.06 0.05  0.00  0.30 
Share of labor cost over total direct cost  1254 0.16  0.04  0.00  0.34 
Share of other cost over total direct cost  1254 0.56  0.08  0.26  0.86 
 
  15Table 2. Mississippi cotton insurance coverage among surveyed producers from 1998-
2007 
Year Insurance  Type  Total 
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Total  704 328  120 27 75  1254 
 
  16Table 3. Results of price and cross price effects from trans-log cost function estimation 
Variable   Label  Parameter Estimate  Approx Std 
Err 
 Intercept  a0  1.516103  0.9706 
Y ln   log of yield  ay  0.026521  0.3133 
()
2 lnY  
(log of yield)^2  ayy  -0.00416  0.0503 
1 ln p   log of  fertilizer price  b1  0.214653***  0.00244 
2 ln p   log of herbicide price  b2  0.193197***  0.00267 
3 ln p   log of insecticide price  b3  0.148828***  0.00336 
4 ln p   log of labor price  b4  0.276636***  0.00431 
2
2
1 ) 1 (ln p   ½*(log of fertilizer price )^2  b11  0.081048***  0.00160 
2 ln * 1 ln p p   log fertilizer price* log herbicide 
price 
b12 -0.00669***  0.00126 
3 ln * 1 ln p p   log fertilizer price* log insecticide 
price 
b13 -0.00951***  0.00105 
4 ln * 1 ln p p   log fertilizer price* log labor price  b14  -0.00453***  0.00168 
5 ln * 1 ln p p   log fertilizer price* log other price  b15  -0.06031***  0.00109 
2
2
1 ) 2 (ln p   ½*(log of herbicide price)^2  b22  0.071434***  0.00179 
3 ln * 2 ln p p   log herbicide price* log insecticide 
price 
b23 -0.00437***  0.00117 
4 ln * 2 ln p p   log herbicide price* log labor price  b24  -0.00909***  0.00160 
5 ln * 2 ln p p   log herbicide price* log other price  b25  -0.05128***  0.00105 
2
2
1 ) 3 (ln p   ½*(log of insecticide price)^2  b33  0.051495***  0.00187 
4 ln * 3 ln p p   log insecticide price* log labor price  b34  -0.00519***  0.00116 
5 ln * 3 ln p p   log insecticide price* log other price  b35  -0.03242***  0.00116 
2
2
1 ) 4 (ln p   ½*(log of labor price price )^2  b44  0.119523***  0.00385 
5 ln * 4 ln p p   log labor price* log other price  b45  -0.10071***  0.00283 
2  ½*(log of fertilizer price )^2  b55  0.244726***  0.00313 
2
1 ) 5 (ln p
Note: *** denotes the estimate is significant at 1% level. 
 
  17Table 4. Results of insurance effects from trans-log cost function estimation 
Variable   Label  Parameter Estimate  Approx Std 
Err 
Y98*DM_Buyup  Interaction of Year 1998 and 
Buyup insurance 
D98 0.008704 0.0288 
Y99*DM_Buyup  Interaction of Year 1999 and 
Buyup insurance 
D99 0.001292 0.0216 
Y00*DM_Buyup  Interaction of Year 2000 and 
Buyup insurance 
D00 0.012894 0.00974 
Y01*DM_Buyup  Interaction of Year 2001 and 
Buyup insurance 
D01 0.022944***  0.00638 
Y02*DM_Buyup  Interaction of Year 2002 and 
Buyup insurance 
D02 0.010374 0.00729 
Y03*DM_Buyup  Interaction of Year 2003 and 
Buyup insurance 
D03 -0.0017 0.00643 
Y04*DM_Buyup  Interaction of Year 2004 and 
Buyup insurance 
D04 0.000299 0.0122 
Y05*DM_Buyup  Interaction of Year 2005and 
Buyup insurance 
D05 -0.03112*** 0.0105 
Y06*DM_Buyup  Interaction of Year 2006 and 
Buyup insurance 
D06 -0.00213 0.0119 
DM_delta  Delta region dummy  delta  0.006845***  0.00199 
DM_irr Irrigation  dummy  irr  0.001574  0.00496 
t Trend  dummy  DM_t  0.00114  0.000899 
Lp1*DM_Buyup  Interaction of fertilizer price and 
Buyup insurance 
DM1 -0.0032 0.00204 
Lp2*DM_Buyup  Interaction of herbicide price and 
Buyup insurance 
DM2 0.00463***  0.0018 
Lp3*DM_Buyup Interaction  of insecticide price and 
Buyup insurance 
DM3 -0.00165 0.00247 
Lp4*DM_Buyup  Interaction of labor price and 
Buyup insurance 
DM4 -0.00215 0.00172 
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Table5. Allen elasticities of substitution  
Allen12 Allen13 Allen14 Allen23 Allen24 Allen34 
0.4236 -0.2165 0.7670 0.2595 0.3812 0.4754 
(0.1084) (0.1345) (0.0863) (0.1975) (0.1092) (0.1169) 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are the standard errors. 
 
Table 6. Own and cross price elasticities of input demands 
 Fertilizer  Herbicide  Insecticide Labor  inputs 
Fertilizer -0.2224  0.0396 -0.0137  0.1204 
 (0.0129)  (0.0101)  (0.0085)  (0.0135) 
Herbicide 0.0525  -0.1432 0.0164  0.0598 
 (0.0134)  (0.0191)  (0.0125)  (0.0171) 
Insecticide -0.0269 0.0243  -0.1205  0.0746 
 (0.0167)  (0.0185)  (0.0296)  (0.0183) 
Labor inputs  0.0951  0.0357  0.0300  -0.0813 
 (0.0107)  (0.0102)  (0.0074)  (0.0245) 
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are the standard errors. 
 